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 COMMENT 
DISCOUNTING, ON STILTS 
Douglas A. Kysar∗ 
 Jeremy Bentham famously described the concept of natural law rights as 
“nonsense on stilts.”1 This Comment argues that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of public 
policy—a contemporary applied version of Bentham’s utilitarianism—is also nonsensical 
in that CBA purports to resolve questions, the answers to which have already been 
subsumed within the framework’s architecture. In particular, CBA subsumes vital 
questions of intergenerational equity through its use of an exponential discount factor to 
adjust future costs and benefits to a present value. This discounting procedure has the 
practical effect of dramatically diminishing the apparent significance of policy effects on 
future generations in the context of problems such as climate change, species extinction, 
deforestation, and aquifer depletion. Indeed, the impact of discounting future costs and 
benefits to a present value tends to swamp all other variables within such long-term 
policy analyses.2 Accordingly, arguments in favor of the use and selection of a discount 
rate for CBA calculation deserve close inspection.3 
As it turns out, the conventional justifications offered for the use of discounting in 
the intergenerational context do not withstand scrutiny. Moreover, although some 
analysts are careful to acknowledge the need to address questions of intergenerational 
equity directly through other policy mechanisms,4 these analysts understate the difficulty 
of limiting discounted CBA to its proper sphere of competence. The formal language of 
CBA offers the promise—but not the reality—of compounding all relevant reasons for 
deciding into its calculations, including the needs and interests of future generations. 
Because ex post monetary transfers are thought to compensate for any residual interests 
that CBA has failed to incorporate into its calculations, policymakers and commentators 
are invited to believe that CBA can resolve most any social dilemma without the need for 
openly moral judgments concerning fairness or justice. Naturally, when faced with a 
dauntingly complex and morally inflected policy conundrum such as climate change, the 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to the organizers of the Intergenerational 
Discounting and Intergenerational Equity conference, held at the University of Chicago Law School on 
April 27-28, 2006, for inviting me to participate in the conference, and to the editors of the University of 
Chicago Law Review for publishing this Comment. This research was supported, in part, by the National 
Science Foundation’s Nanotechnology and Interdisciplinary Research Award #0304483. 
1 Jeremy Bentham, A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights, in BENTHAM’S POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 257, 269 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1973). 
2 See CLIVE L. SPASH, GREENHOUSE ECONOMICS: VALUES AND ETHICS (2002). 
3 For overviews of the discounting debate, see Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and 
Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109 (2005); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural 
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 555 
(2004). 
4 Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and 
Intergenerational Equity, __ U. CHI. L. REV. __ (2006). 
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temptation to delegate responsibility to the calculative process in this manner is 
overwhelming. Yet, as this Comment argues, the compensatory transfers that are thought 
to sanitize the CBA procedure in the intergenerational context are deeply problematic, 
both in their conception and in their amenability to concrete realization. 
 The organizers of the Intergenerational Equity and Intergenerational Discounting 
conference and the editors of the University of Chicago Law Review have done the legal 
academy a tremendous service by soliciting and publishing the papers included in this 
issue, which include contributions from prominent legal scholars, economists, and 
philosophers and which cover a range of views on the purpose and practice of 
discounting. Nevertheless, as this Comment argues, a great deal of analytical confusion 
remains in the literature. In the end, the most important claim in the set of papers is also 
the one least served by discounted CBA: “If respecting future generations means 
anything, it should mean respecting our best guess as to their wishes and helping them as 
much as feasible.”5 Perhaps with the publication of these papers, legal scholars and others 
interested in long-term policymaking will finally be able to put aside debates over 
discounting and focus instead on the more important task of conceiving and realizing 
equitable relations between human generations. 
I.  DISCOUNTING RESOURCES 
 
Although discounting is most controversial when applied to human lives,6 the 
procedure also turns out to be problematic when applied to ordinary resources. In that 
respect, many of the general arguments that have been offered in defense of the use of 
discounting in the intergenerational policy context can be dismissed summarily. For 
instance, the possibility that future generations may not come into existence due to 
extinction—which sometimes is used to provide an analytical foundation for 
discounting7—offers little comfort in contexts where the likelihood that future 
generations will survive is itself a function of policy choices that are being made through 
discounted welfare analysis. Similarly, the absurd or paradoxical results that are said to 
flow from a refusal to discount8 fail as defenses of discounting because they assume prior 
adherence by society to a mathematical optimization procedure, when in fact the very 
question being posed is whether intergenerational decisionmaking is best managed 
through that type of social choice mechanism.  
 
Also problematic are justifications for discounting that are premised on the 
observed rate of time preference. As Robert Hahn has described it, “[t]he basic rationale 
for discounting is that consumers are not indifferent between consuming a dollar’s worth 
of a good today and one dollar next year; discount rates are necessary to reflect this 
                                                 
5 Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, __ U. CHI. L. 
REV. __ (2006). 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See PARTHA DASGUPTA & GEOFFREY HEAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES 
(1979). 
8 See W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, __ U. CHI. L. REV. __ (2006). 
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preference.”9 However, by taking revealed preference as the exclusive standard for 
welfare analysis, these justifications fail to acknowledge the fact that a traditional and 
often quite popular role of democratic government has been precisely to counteract the 
influence of consumer impatience.10 Such a role may be all the more important when the 
interests of future generations are at stake, since members of those generations suffer an 
even greater tyranny of the present than the currently living. 
CBA proponents sometimes respond to this preference-overriding point by 
making plain their political commitments: “[O]verriding market prices on ethical grounds 
opens the door to irreconcilable inconsistencies. If ethical arguments, rather than the 
revealed preferences of citizens, form the rationale for a low discount rate cannot ethical 
arguments be applied to other questions?”11 Nowhere in this line of argument, however, 
has the CBA proponent explained why the observed impatience of individual members of 
one generation should govern the consumption opportunities left available to future 
generations. In truth, a need for “ethical arguments” and an “overriding” of preferences 
are inevitable no matter how the present generation proceeds, since the rate of time 
preference of future generations cannot be observed.  
Moreover, even if future generations’ rate of time preference could be observed, 
CBA practitioners have not explained why the relevant period of discounting should 
commence at the moment of calculation, before the lives of future generations have even 
begun. If one is truly following the rationale of respecting individuals’ preferences, then 
discounting of future costs and benefits should only begin and extend for the time period 
that the individuals affected by policy proposals are actually alive and experiencing 
impatience. The cost-benefit analyst instead adopts a constant rate and an uninterrupted 
period of discount because she has entertained a subtle conceptual shift from individual 
preferences to collective welfare impacts. In essence, she has adopted a less transparent 
version of the infinitely lived individual from Cass Sunstein and Arden Rowell’s 
Methuselahville example,12 treating all members of future generations as if they were a 
single, collective interest-holder. But it is difficult to imagine why future generations’ 
would consent to being treated as if their lives were already in decline when they never 
enjoyed the period of youthful extravagance that was gained at their current expense. For 
these and other reasons, many thoughtful commentators have concluded that discounting 
for pure rate of time preference across generations is simply indefensible.13 
                                                 
9 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1021 (2004). 
10 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L. J. 1981, 2048 
(1998).  
11 Kenneth Arrow et al., Are We Consuming Too Much?, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 147 (2004). 
12 See Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 15]. 
13 See Tyler Cowen, Caring About the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It Means, __ U. 
CHI. L. REV. __ (2006) [Draft at 7] (noting that “[i]t is a moot point whether individual time preference for 
utility is rational, but pure time preference across the generations is harder to defend”); Robert R.M. 
Verchick, The Case Against Cost-Benefit Analysis, 32 ECOL. L. Q. 101, 111 (2005) (arguing that the 
conventional “reasoning cannot justify the discounting of protections for future generations whose 
consumers have yet to vote in the marketplace”) (reviewing FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, 
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Defenses of discounting that are premised on opportunity costs are more plausible 
than the justifications just discussed.14 By discounting future costs and benefits according 
to the rate of return available for alternative uses of public funds, policymakers are 
thought to ensure that future generations will be left with an endowment of resources that 
has taken advantage of the best available investment opportunities. Louis Kaplow puts 
the point more succinctly: “Discounting dollars is justified because the market discount 
rate is a price that signifies resource costs just like any other price.”15 Moreover, as 
Samida and Weisbach argue, the opportunity costs characterization suggests that the 
practice of discounting in the intergenerational context may in fact be “required by any 
moral theory that accepts the Pareto criterion.”16 This is because any policy expenditure 
that fails discounted CBA could instead be devoted to alternative investments, the 
proceeds of which could in part be used to compensate those who are harmed by rejection 
of the policy.  
Nevertheless, the opportunity costs defense of discounting in the intergenerational 
context also fails for a variety of reasons. First, in order to sustain what would otherwise 
amount to a gross conflation between potential and actual Pareto improvements—
between Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiency—these justifications assume that sufficient 
intergenerational resource transfers will be undertaken to ensure that future generations 
are left better off even after their interests have been exponentially discounted.17 The 
precise manner in which such transfers are to be undertaken is generally left unstated or 
is relegated to the same “political process” dustbin that often is used to address matters of 
intragenerational equity.18 Worse still, some analysts revert to a conjuring trick in which 
compensatory transfers are deemed unnecessary to forgive our future sins, given the 
legacy of economic growth and technological progress that analysts are confident we will 
bequeath to future generations, so long as public regulators simply stay out of the way.19 
                                                                                                                                                 
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004)); Richard L. 
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 941, 998 (1999) (describing “[t]he ethically compromised status of discounting for time 
preference at a constant rate” across, rather than within, generations); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
287 (1971) (stating that “from a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting future well-being 
on the basis of pure time preference”). 
14 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 17] (observing that “the dominant approach” in setting 
the rate of discount for policy evaluation looks to market rates of interest that reflect the opportunity costs 
of displacing private capital investment). 
15 Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice 
and Efficiency, __ U. CHI. L. REV. __ (2006) [Draft at 4]. 
16 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 2]. 
17 Samida and Weisbach, for instance, state that “[t]he main assumption made by the [Pareto 
dominance] theorem that might affect its application to intergenerational projects is that it assumes that the 
tax and transfer system can be adjusted to offset the effects of the project.” Samida & Weisbach, supra note 
__ [Draft at 20]. 
18 See Robert N. Stavins et al., Interpreting Sustainability in Economic Terms: Dynamic Efficiency 
Plus Intergenerational Equity, 79 ECON. LETTERS 339, 341 (2003). 
19 Along these lines, Viscusi observes that future generations are likely to be “more affluent and 
better off economically than we are,” and therefore asserts that “[t]he current citizenry . . . might not be too 
moved by the plight of their more affluent, distant descendants.” Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 2]. See 
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Like the occasional technological pessimism of environmentalists, this “trickle forward” 
defense of discounting is more of a mood than an argument.  
Even viewed charitably, the argument misfires for, as Geoffrey Heal points out, it 
“is not an intertemporal judgment, but rather an interpersonal one.”20 That is, the 
argument seeks to discount impacts on future generations, not because they will happen 
in the future, but because they will happen to individuals who are wealthier than those 
who presently exist. This point is made plain in Kip Viscusi’s contribution, when the 
author observes that if willingness-to-pay to reduce risks to life were adjusted for 
economic growth (perhaps on the theory that the demand for safety is elastic with 
income21), then society would be required to greatly favor lifesaving in the future under 
certain plausible assumptions regarding the discount rate and the value of a statistical 
life.22 Viscusi objects to this conclusion by stating that “[t]here is no valid economic 
rationale for this preferential treatment of future generations.”23 But in fact the economic 
rationale is plain: If the goal of public policymaking is simply the maximization of social 
welfare, and if the chosen mode of analysis fails to account for the declining marginal 
utility of income in its use of willingness-to-pay measures for the value of life, then it 
follows ineluctably that richer generations’ lives count more in the social welfare 
function than poorer. Viscusi is in fact objecting to the clear implication of the economic 
rationale, not to its absence. 
Second, to give the compensatory transfer argument practical significance in the 
environmental context, states would need to develop some more or less comprehensive 
system of national accounting to ensure that the resource base to support future well-
being actually is being expanded (or at least preserved) for the benefit of future 
generations. At present, the danger is too great that consumption may be confused for 
investment, that environmental externalities may be inadequately accounted for, and that 
many important natural resources and ecosystem services may be absent from national 
ledgers altogether.24 Moreover, if the system of environmental accounting revealed that 
the total capital stock was not being preserved adequately for the benefit of future 
generations—as many expect it would25—then some socially controlled mechanism of 
                                                                                                                                                 
also R.C. Lind, Intergenerational Equity, Discounting, and the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 ENERGY 
POLICY 379 (1995) (“[I]n all likelihood future generations will be much richer than the present one and if 
they (future generations) want lower levels of greenhouse gases and lower temperature levels they should 
pay for them.”). Even John Rawls, who deserves credit for reviving interest in the problem of 
intergenerational justice, seemed to implicitly assume a unidirectional upward trend in progress and well-
being. See RAWLS, supra note __, at 287 (suggesting that the condition of not knowing to which generation 
one belongs is equivalent to not knowing which stage of civilization one will experience). 
20 Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of the Basic Economics, __ U. CHI. L. REV. __ (2006). 
21 See HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra note __. 
22 Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 30]. 
23 Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 30]. 
24 See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 675 
(2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 
BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 1 (2001). 
25 See infra text accompanying notes __-__. 
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intergenerational capital transfer would be required in order to satisfy the Pareto criterion 
or, alternatively, in order to guarantee a minimum sustainable level of well-being for all 
generations across time. The task of designing and implementing such an 
intergenerational transfer mechanism would, in turn, necessitate societal discussion 
regarding the most reliable method of accomplishing intergenerational transfers and the 
precise composition of the resource base that is to be left for the benefit of posterity. 
Along those lines, Dexter Samida and David Weisbach suggest that all methods 
of transferring resources intergenerationally may be equally likely to be undone by 
intervening generations.26 Their suggestion, however, entails a commensurated view of 
the world that the public may not, in fact, widely share: When past generations 
designated miles of extraordinary lakeshore real estate in the city of Chicago for public 
purposes, they altered the social meaning of that resource in a way that made it more 
resistant to raiding by intervening generations. By designating the Chicago lakeshore a 
“Public Ground — Common to Remain Forever Open, Clear, and Free of Any Buildings, 
or Other Obstruction Whatever,”27 the planners of Chicago’s lakeshore made its 
continued preservation a matter of intergenerational distributive equity, rather than 
market allocative efficiency—a cultural “coding” that rendered the space less amenable 
to characterization as a resource that could be used more profitably in some other 
manner. In the process, those planners also made an openly normative judgment 
regarding the kind of city, and the kind of lives, that they believed Chicago and its 
residents should embody.  
Discounters tend to reject such resource- and value-specific intergenerational 
planning on the theory that perfect substitutability exists among the varieties of human 
and natural capital. Thus, Kaplow argues that “it is incomplete and potentially misleading 
to suggest that the present generation does (or does not) have an obligation to a future 
generation to do one specific thing or another, such as cleaning up the environment, 
conserving nonrenewable resources, or avoiding accumulation of a large debt.”28 
Similarly, Sunstein and Rowell assert that “there is no abstract reason to believe that 
preserving a particular environmental amenity (a forest, a lake) is always better for 
posterity than other investments that do not involve the environment in particular 
(expenditures on basic research, reductions in national debt).”29 In short, so long as 
capital of any description is retained in sufficient amounts to support a theoretically 
nondeclining stream of welfare, discounters tend to believe that society can remain 
                                                 
26 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 18]. 
27 See Payton Chung, History of Lake Shore Drive, available at 
http://www.foreverfreeandclear.org/node/14. 
28 Kaplow, supra note __ [Draft at 7]. 
29 Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 24]. See also Arrow et al., supra note __, at 151 
(“Even if some resources such as stocks of minerals are drawn down along a consumption path, the 
sustainability criterion could nevertheless be satisfied if other capital assets were accumulated sufficiently 
to offset the resource decline.”); Robert M. Solow, An Almost Practical Step Toward Sustainability, 19 
RESOURCES POL’Y 162, 168 (1993) (“The duty imposed by sustainability is to bequest to posterity not any 
particular thing . . . but rather to endow them with whatever it takes to achieve a standard of living at least 
as good as our own and to look after their next generation similarly.”). 
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indifferent concerning the precise composition of the resource base that is bequeathed to 
future generations. 
 
The assumption that intergenerational equity can be addressed through the 
transfer of an unspecified resource base deserves more scientific attention than 
discounting proponents tend to provide. After all, many physical scientists who have 
addressed the environmental sustainability question are far less sanguine than economists 
and other social scientists. Indeed, during the lead-up to the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, for instance, the 
National Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society of London issued an unprecedented 
joint statement, entitled “Population Growth, Resource Consumption, and a Sustainable 
World.” The statement observed that  
 
[s]cientific and technological innovations, such as in agriculture, have 
been able to overcome many pessimistic predictions about resource 
constraints affecting human welfare. Nevertheless, the present patterns of 
human activity accentuated by population growth should make even those 
most optimistic about future scientific progress pause and reconsider the 
wisdom of ignoring these threats to our planet. Unrestrained resource 
consumption for energy production and other uses, especially if the 
developing world strives to achieve living standards based on the same 
levels of consumption as the developed world, could lead to catastrophic 
outcomes for the global environment.30 
 
An even more strident pre-Rio statement organized by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists was endorsed by over 1,700 scientists, including a majority of the living Nobel 
laureates in the sciences. The statement began 
 
Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human 
activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment 
and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put 
at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and 
animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable 
to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are 
urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring 
about.31 
 
The fact that social scientists continue to adhere to the perfect substitutability 
assumption in the face of concerns such as these is probably not attributable to a 
disregard by them for the knowledge and credibility of natural scientists. Instead, it likely 
originates from a fear that accepting the natural scientists’ position would undermine the 
                                                 
30 See The Royal Society of London and the National Academy of Sciences, Population Growth, 
Resource Consumption, and a Sustainable World (1992).   
31 See World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity (1992), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/ucs/about/1992-world-scientists-warning-to-humanity.html. 
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liberal project of avoiding government arbitration among competing conceptions of the 
good (or the related economic project of avoiding interpersonal welfare comparisons).32 
After all, even liberal theorists such as John Rawls, who otherwise favor the distribution 
of certain primary goods to individuals as a matter of right, tend to back off of resourcist 
approaches in the intergenerational context. Rawls’s “just savings” principle of 
intergenerational justice, for instance, required each generation only to contribute to an 
accumulation of capital that would “make possible the conditions needed to establish and 
to preserve a just basic structure over time,”33 not necessarily to preserve this or that 
resource for the benefit of future generations. 
 
Had Rawls pursued further the question of whether the just savings principle 
could be satisfied through transfer of a relatively undifferentiated resource base—as 
opposed to resource transfers dictated by more specific ecological needs and 
constraints—he might have come to perceive that the problems of environmental 
sustainability and intergenerational justice represent a serious challenge to liberal 
agnosticism on competing accounts of the good.34 To give just one illustration, the desire 
to preserve living coral reefs for enjoyment and appreciation by future generations would 
seem to require immediate and drastic changes to the lifestyles of the currently living, 
given that current food, transportation, energy, agriculture, and land use patterns 
associated with those lifestyles threaten both directly and indirectly the survival of all 
living coral reefs on the planet.35 In other words, it does not appear that society can have 
it all, at least not in a sustainable manner. Thus, so long as affluent consumers continue to 
regard their conception of the good as being dependent on the acquisition of more and 
better goods, liberalism would seem to be in conflict with the needs and interests of 
future generations. 
 
Finally, the opportunity costs defense of discounting suffers from what is 
arguably a logical error: Proponents of discounting hinge the decision whether to 
conserve natural resources for future generations on the size of the opportunity cost that 
is entailed by conservation, when in fact much of environmental policymaking is better 
conceived of as being determinative of—rather than determined by—the market rates of 
return that embody such opportunity costs. That is, if the savings rate for fossil fuels, 
                                                 
32 See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 2109 (2005). 
33 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 159 (2001). 
34 Elsewhere, Rawls stated that “[e]ach generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and 
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it most also put aside 
in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation.” RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 
supra note __, at 285. This statement seems to imply a worldview in which preserving “the gains of culture 
and civilization” need not come at any cost to present ways of living. Ronald Dworkin similarly suggests 
that liberals can properly favor conservation out of a desire to preserve the ability of future generations to 
revere and recreate in natural areas. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60 
(Michael Sandel ed., 1984). Like Rawls, Dworkin fails to acknowledge that the desire to preserve particular 
cultural or natural resources for future generations may place serious limitations on a liberal government’s 
ability to afford present individuals wide scope for self-determination and private flourishing.  
35 
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arable soil, freshwater, wetlands, and other forms natural capital in part determines the 
rate of return for all capital—if, in other words, the decision whether to conserve natural 
resources influences the size of the opportunity cost that supposedly determines whether 
or not it is optimal to conserve—then the justification for discounting by market rates of 
return is circular. 
Samida and Weisbach attempt to avoid this problem of circularity by citing, but 
not describing, an explanation from John Broome’s important article on discounting.36 
Broome’s explanation actually turns out only to be an assertion; namely, his assertion that 
“[i]t is a fair approximation to think of . . . interest rates as given independently of 
decisions about saving.”37 In other words, Broome assumes that interest rates reflect “the 
relative values people attach to present and future commodities,”38 rather than a much 
more complex combination of private actions and public policies, including many of the 
same public policies that supposedly are best addressed by comparison to interest rates. 
Moreover, by relying on Broome’s response to the circularity critique, Samida and 
Weisbach have smuggled back into their argument the pure rate of time preference 
argument that they attempted to disclaim at the outset of their piece.39 Thus, they now 
must offer an affirmative argument in favor of treating one generation’s impatience as a 
guidepost for its moral responsibilities to another generation, precisely the argument that 
Richard Revesz and others have shown to be elusive.40 
To be sure, the circularity of the opportunity costs defense of discounting may not 
be especially problematic for decisions of modest practical impact, in which the ultimate 
outcome might not be affected by the specification of a different reference case of 
resource rights and rate of return. But it seems clearly inappropriate for addressing the 
type of substantial, long-term issues like climate change and energy policy that motivate 
critics of discounted CBA. In that respect, commentators may be too optimistic in their 
view of what counts as a general equilibrium or global problem, as opposed to a partial 
equilibrium or local problem. For instance, although Heal recognizes the endogeneity 
associated with using market rates of interest to determine resource policies,41 he argues 
that it is still appropriate to use the market rate of interest for “a purely local decision, 
such as the conservation of a local fishery or forest.”42 But even this limited use of 
market rates of discount still could lead to an intolerable general equilibrium, if the same 
reasoning is independently applied to a series of seemingly “local” projects across the 
economy. Over the past half century, after all, a series of “local” fishery collapses 
accumulated into a state of pervasive crisis in the world’s oceans.43  
                                                 
36 See John Broome, Discounting the Future, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 128, 140 (1994). See 
Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 3]. See supra text accompanying note __. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 3]. 
40 See supra text accompanying note __. 
41 Heal, supra note __ [Draft at 7, 11]. 
42 Id. at __ [Draft at 10]. 
43  
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Kaplow also recognizes the endogeneity problem, but argues that the effects for 
most projects “are likely to be very small (short of radical, worldwide shifts).”44 But it is 
an empirical question how significantly environmental policy and market rates of interest 
would be impacted if policymakers heeded the problem of endogeneity. Considering the 
current level of environmentally harmful subsidization that exists within most 
industrialized economies,45 it seems at least plausible that “radical, worldwide shifts” in 
policy are precisely what is needed before the endogeneity problem can safely be ignored 
in the manner suggested by Kaplow. After all, there is no objective or free market price 
that can be identified for nonrenewable and exhaustible resources such as oil or timber—
resources that nevertheless lie at the foundation of a substantial portion of all economic 
activity in industrialized countries. In the theoretical literature, the standard wisdom 
regarding such resources is that the net returns from their extraction should be reinvested 
in reproducible capital in order to ensure sustainability and intergenerational equity.46 But 
analysts must have some prior notion of the shadow price of exhaustible resources in 
order to determine the amount of reinvestment required. That notion, in turn, requires 
making judgments about the policy features of an idealized economy in which “various 
components of . . . ecological capital” are maintained above “critical threshold levels 
which are stipulated to be preserved to ensure system resilience”47—precisely the kinds 
of judgments that welfare economists instead want to subject to discounted CBA using 
current, unsustainable market prices. 
 
In short, the need to directly address intergenerational resource equity cannot be 
avoided: Even thought experiments involving perfect futures markets and zero 
transaction costs face the problem of establishing the initial endowment of resources 
between generations. That is, every distribution of resources between generations gives 
rise to a different market equilibrium, including within that equilibrium a resultant market 
rate of interest that reflects the opportunity cost of capital.48 Because much of 
environmental law and policymaking is concerned precisely with the question of resource 
distribution among generations, it does not make sense to hinge such policymaking on the 
existing discount rate. 
                                                 
44 Kaplow, supra note __ [Draft at 26]. 
45 See generally OECD, Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Policy Issues and Challenges (2002). 
46 See John Hartwick, Intergenerational Equity And The Investing Of Rents From Exhaustible 
Resources, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 972, 973–74 (1977).  
47 P.K. RAO, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMICS AND POLICY 105 (2000).   
48 Analysts identify this contingency when they discuss the possibility of using a contractualist 
approach to determining the content of intergenerational justice, yet they seem not to recognize how 
seriously the contingency limits the normativity of the results of any particular cost-benefit maximization 
exercise. See, e.g., Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 17] (“[I]t is necessary to identify some 
entitlements on the part of both [present and future generations], setting the background against which they 
might bargain. To be plausible, any such specification will inevitably have to depend on an independent 
normative account of some kind, and that independent account, rather than a notion of intergenerational 
bargaining as such, will be doing the crucial work.”); Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 13] 
(observing that “it is difficult to even imagine a bargain [between generations] because the ethical 
discussion is about the rights and responsibilities of each generations and without a background set of 
rights and responsibilities, there cannot easily be a bargain”). 
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II.  DISCOUNTING LIVES 
 
On top of difficulties associated with intergenerational resource distribution, 
discounting becomes even more problematic when future impacts of policy proposals 
include enhanced human mortality and morbidity. Defenders of discounting tend to 
assume that “the value of life (and non-life harms) is properly measured, and that life, 
risks to life, and enjoyment of life can be measured in money,”49 believing that this 
assumption will allow them to demonstrate the Pareto superiority of intergenerational 
discounting separate and apart from problems of valuation. They argue somewhat 
defensively that their procedure does not require the discounting of future lives, but rather 
only the discounting of “costs and benefits,”50 “people’s willingness to pay to reduce 
statistical risks”51 or “a monetary amount equal to the willingness to pay to reduce risks 
to life.”52 They insist that “what is being discounted is the monetary value of the risk 
itself,” and that the relevant issue is a “technical economics question” and does not 
concern “an ethical question about whether discounting is appropriate.”53  
 
These analysts protest too much. The Pareto criterion is normally thought to be 
the gold standard among welfarists because it avoids the problem of interpersonal welfare 
comparisons.54 That is, each individual herself determines whether she is made better 
off—or at least no worse off—by a proposed project. Whatever one thinks of such an 
approach for decisionmaking within generations, the framework does not translate 
smoothly to decisionmaking between generations for the simple reason that future 
generations do not yet exist. Thus, there can be no Pareto criterion in the 
intergenerational context, at least not so long as that term is understood to include 
individuals themselves determining whether they are made better or worse off by a policy 
proposal.55 This is no minor complication: The practice of divining and satisfying the 
preference functions of future generations must stand on a normative foothold that is 
separate and distinct from that which typically supports intragenerational welfare 
approaches. Such a foothold has yet to be identified.56 
                                                 
49 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 5]. 
50 Samida and Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 10]. 
51 Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 2]. 
52 Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 28]. 
53 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 25]. 
54 See Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1791, 1795 (2003) (observing that “the Pareto standard avoids the need for interpersonal comparisons by 
giving each individual a veto over changes”). 
55 See Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 9] (“Willingness to pay is the foundation for 
valuation, and current willingness to pay can be used to measure both risks that will come to fruition 
immediately and risks that will come to fruition in the future.”). 
56 Thus, Samida and Weisbach are not correct to state that “[w]hether life or enjoyment can be 
measured with money is an interesting problem but it is orthogonal to the issues presented by discounting.” 
Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 5]. Unless it is to remain at a level of theoretical abstraction 
that is of only marginal practical and intellectual interest, the Pareto standard must be given operability 
through the specification of an actual method of determining whether a particular generation is made 
  12
 
In that respect, the most powerful normative argument for discounting—that it 
will leave future generations with a more valuable stock of resources—is embarrassed by 
the fact that some members of those future generations are sacrificed in favor of the very 
alternative investments that are supposed to inure to their benefit. At times, this 
embarrassment seems to be clear to all but the CBA proponent himself. One prominent 
discussion of CBA and climate change, for instance, included the claim that “whether 
future generations will accept an increase in the rate of skin cancer or not depends upon 
what they get in exchange for it.”57 Likewise, Samida and Weisbach assert that “[i]f we 
could ask future generations whether they would want us to engage in this project, they 
would prefer that we just invest the money at the market rate of return because they 
would be better off with such an investment.”58 
But notice what has happened through these rhetorical gestures: The authors have 
subtly shifted from an individualist to a collectivist conception of the relevant interest-
holder, such that the same entity (“future generations”) that incurs the costs of increased 
mortality also appears to be the one that receives compensation for the loss.59 In both 
instances, future generations are deemed to be the relevant interest-holder, but the cost-
benefit valuation exercise that led to the imposition of increased risk of death proceeded 
on the basis on an individualistic assessment of welfare. This conceptual shift from the 
individual to the collective perspective can entail the absurd result that future generations 
appear to be “better off” even when they have been rendered extinct.60 That is, nothing 
within the framework excludes the possibility that it would be “efficient” or “welfare-
maximizing” to kill off every single member of a future generation such that humanity 
ceases to exist, while the stock of capital that makes them “better off” continues to grow 
exponentially in bank accounts that will never be withdrawn.61 
All the discounting proponent really demonstrates by appealing to opportunity 
costs is the fact that a life lost in the future may be compensated for at lower cost than a 
                                                                                                                                                 
“better” or “worse off” by a policy proposal. Thus, Samida and Weisbach’s refusal to make such a 
specification means that, like other prominent defenders of welfare economic analysis such as Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, their argument borders closely on the tautological. See Jules Coleman, The 
Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L. J. 1511 (2003) (reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002) and arguing that its central normative claim—“that welfare, and not 
fairness, is the standard appropriate to assessing the law”—is supported only by “empty tautological claims 
and underdeveloped putative causal explanations”). 
57 E. Neumayer, Global Warming: Discounting Is Not the Issue, But Sustainability Is, 27 ENERGY 
POLICY 33 (1999). 
58 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 12]. 
59 Cf. supra text accompanying notes __-__ (describing a similar conceptual slide with respect to 
the pure rate of time preference justification for discounting). 
60 Cf. Lisa Heinzerling, The Accidental Environmentalist: Judge Posner on Catastrophic Thinking, 
94 GEO. L. J. 833, 857 (2006). 
61 See Cowen, supra note __, at __ [Draft at 6-7] (“Under a positive discount rate, no matter how 
long, one life today can be worth more than one million lives in the future, or worth the entire subsequent 
survival of the human race, if we use a long enough time horizon.”). 
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life lost today. The decision actually to sacrifice the life—and thereby to bring about a 
situation in which compensation becomes relevant—remains an entirely separate, and 
philosophically more problematic, matter.62 The potential for confusion in this area is 
evident in Samida and Weisbach’s response to Derek Parfit’s famous deformity example, 
in which Parfit argued that the harm associated with genetic deformities—as opposed to 
the ability to provide financial compensation for them—does not vary with time.63 
Samida and Weisbach counter that discounting future deformities to a present value 
nevertheless is appropriate because “the cost of care of or cure for deformities is likely to 
go down over time.”64 
Even on its own terms, this argument is weakened when evaluated from the 
standpoint of actual well-being, as opposed to the monetary equivalents of well-being. 
That is because the same economic forces that purportedly enable a present generation to 
set aside a lesser amount today to compensate for a harm tomorrow also imply that the 
amount required to compensate for a harm tomorrow will be greater, due to the declining 
marginal utility of wealth, commodities, and other tangible forms of compensation. 
Samida and Weisbach instead argue that “[s]tubbing one’s toe remains stubbing one’s 
toe” even with rising income, so long as the discount rate is set equal to “the expected 
long-run economic growth” of the society.65 But their argument depends on a host of 
undefended assumptions regarding the ability to translate well-being into money and to 
commensurate all potential sources and levels of well-being with each other. The 
monetary equivalent of stubbing one’s toe only remains proportionate with rising income 
if the pain of stubbing one’s toe can be monetized in the same fashion as any other good, 
and if the “monetary equivalent” of pain behaves similarly to those other goods as 
income shifts and time progresses. Whatever the validity of this depiction for toe-
stubbing, it is implausible for death and other extreme inflictions of harm, where the 
moral and psychological weight of the injury caused to future individuals may bear little 
relationship to the long-run economic growth rate.66 
More fundamentally, Samida and Weisbach misstate the nature of the 
intergenerational policymaking challenge: The moral question on the table is not how 
efficiently to care for or cure a deformity that has already been suffered. The question 
instead is whether to inflict the harm in the first place. By presuming that there is no 
difference between living as a non-deformed individual and living as a compensated 
individual with a deformity, the authors violate the most fundamental ethical precept, that 
                                                 
62 See SPASH, supra note __, at 241 (“If future generations are to be losers then an explicit 
judgment to that effect is required and the consequent moral regret and case for compensation must be 
considered.”). 
63 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 483 (1984). 
64 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 24]. 
65 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 27].  
66 See Broome, supra note __, at 149 (“A present deformity will require some quantity of present 
commodities as compensation. A future deformity will require a greater quantity of future commodities, 
because the future deformity is just as bad as the present one, but the future commodities are less 
valuable.”).  
  14
individuals should not be used without their consent as means, rather than as ends. This is 
why in the intergenerational context one cannot separate the issue of discounting from 
valuation, from the issue of whether and how to monetize life. This is why asserting that 
“[o]nce risk has been monetized, it has been translated into money, and may be 
discounted as such,”67 simply pushes the important moral decision back one step in the 
analysis, to the question of valuation. It is one thing, in other words, to presume 
individualized consent to environmental, health, and safety risks based on revealed 
preference studies within the current generation.68 It is quite another to presume such 
consent among individuals who have neither vote nor voice nor volition to leave our 
political community and its sphere of impact.  
III. DISCOUNTING ALTERNATIVES 
Nothing in the foregoing analysis is intended to suggest that analysts are not right 
to be focusing on opportunity costs, only that such costs should not be compounded into 
the cost-benefit exercise in a mechanical fashion without first asking important normative 
questions about intergenerational justice. In what remains the most thoughtful discussion 
of discounting in the environmental law literature, Richard Revesz concludes that 
intergenerational decisionmaking should “take account of” opportunity costs, but not be 
dictated by a particular discount rate. Samida and Weisbach argue that Revesz is 
“incorrect” to think that there is a distinction between these two positions.69 Later, they 
report that they “fail to see how one mathematical procedure can present different moral 
issues than another identical mathematical procedure.”70 These arguments miss their 
mark, for they presume a kind of calculative compulsion that Revesz specifically rejects. 
Not all rationality is formalized, and despite the frequent claim that cost-benefit analysis 
is desirable because it encourages comprehensive assessment of outcomes, it is in fact 
only formalized systems such as cost-benefit analysis that must, by their very nature, be 
incomplete. As Gödel famously demonstrated, no formal system of minimal complexity 
can be both consistent and complete.71  
Revesz recognizes this unavoidable dilemma and chooses to sacrifice consistency 
by viewing opportunity costs as but one factor in a pluralistic assessment of 
intergenerational obligation. CBA proponents choose to sacrifice completeness by 
exogenizing the background state of intergenerational rights and responsibilities through 
the use of a discount rate that presumes such questions of equity already have been 
addressed. Thus, through discounting, the fundamental issues of intergenerational 
equity—which risks and resources, as an ethical matter, should be imposed or bestowed 
                                                 
67 Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 8]. 
68 Cf. Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical Lives, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2000). 
69 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 9 n. 14]. 
70 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 25]. 
71 See Kurt Gödel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related 
Systems (1931). See also Guiseppe Dari Mattiacci, Gödel, Kaplow, Shavell: Consistency and Completeness 
in Social Decisionmaking; PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE 
OF NEUROECONOMICS 72 (2003); JOHN D. BARROW, IMPOSSIBILITY: THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE AND THE 
SCIENCE OF LIMITS 218-247 (1998). 
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on future generations?—is conflated with the issue of intergenerational efficiency—
which generation, as a technical matter based on a given rate of discount and distribution 
of entitlements, does or will derive more utility from the use of a resource? Future 
generations, in essence, are forced to outbid present owners by an amount reflecting not 
only the strength of their needs, but also the alternative uses to which all resources—
including the “monetary equivalents” of their own lives—could be put during the 
intervening time periods. This is conceptual confusion. Even if transfers of resources to 
future generations are offered as “compensation” for this bidding disparity, the 
discounting procedure still suffers from a basic flaw: The efficiency exercise that 
determines the amount of compensation due will have proceeded on the basis of a 
discount rate that assumes away the hard work of evaluating intergenerational equity. 
Defenders of cost-benefit analysis at times recognize the need to begin this hard 
work. Viscusi, for instance, observes in passing that “we do not know what [future 
generations] preferences are.”72 Similarly, at one point Samida and Weisbach state that 
“[i]f respecting future generations means anything, it should mean respecting our best 
guess as to their wishes and helping them as much as feasible.”73 But nowhere do the 
analysts actually engage the question of what “our best guess as to their wishes” is, or 
how we might go about constructing and operationalizing a process to divine and satisfy 
those wishes. Instead, they seem to simply assume that future generations will have the 
same needs and desires as we do, and that their interests may be discounted as if they 
belonged entirely to the present generation. This is an odd approach: The one thing we do 
know from climate change is that the future will be vastly different from the present. The 
preferences of future generations undoubtedly will reflect these environmental changes, 
making those preferences quite different from our own. Thus, in order to truly respect 
future generations’ interests, we must undertake an engaged effort to anticipate and 
consider the details of their plight, and to provide the specific institutions and resources 
that they will need in order to endure it. 
 
This is the challenge that the sustainable development policymaking paradigm 
seeks to address,74 a challenge that seems underappreciated by proponents of discounted 
CBA. Viscusi, for instance, refers to sustainability as “an ill-defined environmentalist 
battle cry.”75 He argues that the goal of maintaining a sustainable level of wellbeing over 
time is undesirable because it may deprive current generations of a “large current benefit” 
if the benefit happens to impose “a very small risk that the quality of life for some future 
generation might be an infinitesimal amount lower than our own.”76 Yet the existence of 
such an extreme mathematical scenario does not undermine the importance of 
maintaining a sustainable level of well-being; rather, it underscores the importance of not 
conflating moral and political judgment with mathematical reflex. Viscusi also argues 
                                                 
72 Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 3]. 
73 Samida & Weisbach, supra note __ [Draft at 12]. 
74 See Kysar, supra note __. 
75 Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 36]. 
76 Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 36]. 
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that the goal of sustainability is impractical because “[w]e don’t know the absolute levels 
of [future generations’] quality of life, how much our decisions will alter that quality, or 
how we might go about making a sensible intertemporal interpersonal comparison.”77 Yet 
the fact that we do not know the answers to these profound questions does not render 
them moot; rather, it makes the need to address them all the more urgent. 
 
In that respect, one final danger of discounted CBA needs to be mentioned. 
Moderate defenders of CBA are careful to point out that they do not intend the CBA 
exercise to displace entirely other policy considerations such as distributive equity. They 
simply believe that such considerations should be addressed separately from efficiency 
analysis, typically through the all-purpose vehicle of the tax and transfer system. Sunstein 
and Rowell, for instance, claim that “[w]hatever the proper approach to intergenerational 
equity, the debate over that issue should be separated from the debate over discounting, 
and the former debate should be engaged directly.”78 Elsewhere they state with respect to 
intergenerational resource allocation that “however that sort of allocation should ideally 
be made or is in fact determined, all further consideration of intergenerational dimensions 
of policies – whether involving the environment, infrastructure, research and 
development, education, or social security – dissolves almost entirely into matters of 
efficiency.”79 
 
The underlying conceptual problems raised by Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theroem,80 however, may haunt even those who defend CBA in this more pragmatic 
sense. The problem lies in the fact that the formal language of the cost-benefit framework 
is not only irreducibly incomplete; it also is capable of denying its own incompleteness.81 
That is, even as CBA’s moderate proponents depict the procedure as but one tool in an 
overall suite of policy approaches, CBA implicitly and unavoidably condemns those 
other approaches as undesirable. The tautological conclusion of the formalized welfarist 
framework is that justice and fairness necessarily derograte from efficiency and welfare. 
That is, intergenerational equity can only be achieved at the apparent cost of welfare-
maximization, at least so long as analysts and observers remain fixed to the status quo 
distribution of rights and resources as an efficiency baseline. Little wonder, then, that 
practitioners of CBA attempt to awkwardly subsume the equity interests of future 
generations into the efficiency maximization calculus, as this Comment has argued is 
done by discounting. That approach seems to preserve the nominal comprehensiveness 
                                                 
77 Viscusi, supra note __ [Draft at 37]. 
78 Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __, at 22.  
79 Sunstein & Rowell, supra note __ [Draft at 1]. Similarly, Samida and Weisbach argue that they 
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and optimality of CBA results without revealing that those results are radically contingent 
on the acceptability of the status quo distribution of rights and resources. 
 
At bottom, the disagreement between defenders and critics of discounting arises 
from a difference of view over what constitutes an interesting question. With respect to 
climate change, for instance, a policy approach that focuses on equitable considerations 
would ask first whether future generations are entitled to a minimal level of climate 
stability and freedom from catastrophic harm. Only after that question had forthrightly 
and courageously been answered would questions of welfare-maximization and 
discounted CBA even become relevant, let alone interesting. To holders of this 
perspective, the tendency to narrowly focus on technical aspects of the cost-benefit 
methodology—while ignoring or burying in footnotes the need to also address the 
equitable distribution of rights and resources across human generations—seems rather 
like fiddling with deck chairs . . . on stilts. 
________ 
